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NOTE
HELPLESSLY IMPRISONED: STATE V. HAMMONDS
HOLDS INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED PATIENTS TO




The seminal case of Miranda v. Arizona was decided by the United State
Supreme Court almost fifty years ago and courts continue to wrangle with
the intricacies of its application.' On its face, the holding seems simple
enough: statements obtained during a "custodial interrogation of the de-
fendant" may not be used by the prosecution unless they "demonstrate[] the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination," or what is otherwise known as Miranda warnings. 2 Howev-
er, courts struggle to determine what a custodial interrogation is, and more
importantly, when an otherwise normal line of questioning transitions into a
custodial interrogation.
Recently, State v. Hammonds was decided, in which the North Carolina
Court of Appeals wrestled with the issue of whether an individual who has
been involuntarily committed is considered 'in custody' for purposes of
Miranda warnings.3 The physical restriction being placed on the defendant
while he is questioned by police officers would seem to create a custodial
setting, especially when custodial interrogation is defined by Miranda as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been.
. .otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. '4
Nonetheless, lacking any authority concerning involuntary commitment, the
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University, Philosophy, 2007. I would like to thank my parents Bob and Diane Wolff, for always allow-
ing me to push my boundaries, and my wife, Michelle Wolff, for being my greatest supporter and en-
couraging me to pursue my ambitions. This casenote is dedicated to my children, who are and always
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1. Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. at 444.
3. State v. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d 359 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
4. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
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court drew similarities between the Defendant's circumstances and those
situations concerning prison inmates in order to decide the case.
This case note will flesh out the perspective of the dissenting Judge In-
man, and focus on the distinguishing characteristics of involuntary com-
mitment that the court failed to take into consideration when making its
determination by drawing similarities to those who are incarcerated. 5 It will
discuss how courts determine if a defendant is considered in custody for
purposes of Miranda warnings, and the inadequacies of the court's analysis
in Hammonds in handling the effect that involuntary commitment has on
6that determination. Finally, it will explore the implications of the holding
of Hammonds by discussing the unjustifiable restriction it places on the
constitutional rights of involuntarily committed patients, and the vulnerabil-
ity that exists when the mentally ill, when questioned by law enforcement
officers, are treated in the same manner as those criminals who are incar-
cerated.7
H. THE CASE
Defendant, Tae Kwon Hammonds ("Defendant"), appealed his convic-
tion of robbery with a dangerous weapon, on grounds that the trial court
erred when it failed to suppress his statements that were made while he was
involuntarily committed.8 Defendant argued that under Miranda,9 he was
considered "in custody," and should have been read his Miranda warnings,
and his confession should not have been admitted at trial as a result of the
constitutional violation.10
The questioning of Defendant stemmed from an incident occurring in a
Wal-Mart parking lot at approximately 8:30 p.m. on December 10, 2012.1'
The victim was approached by a man that she described to the police as an
"African-American male with a deep voice" but did not give any further
description. 12 While the victim was preparing to enter her vehicle, she was
approached by the assailant, who took her purse and all of her money at
gunpoint.
13
The following day, December 11, 2012, Defendant was brought to Caro-
linas Medical Center Union Hospital ("Hospital") for treatment after he
5. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 372-74 (Inman, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 364-68.
7. Id. at 368.
8. Id. at 361.
9. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79
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attempted suicide by taking an overdose of pills. 14 While being treated for
his injuries, Defendant was involuntarily committed by a magistrate, and
placed on a 24-hour watch, where he was required to have someone contin-
uously observe him at all times.15 At one point that evening, Defendant
attempted to leave the hospital, but was escorted back to his room by hospi-
tal security.
16
On December 12, 2012, while still involuntarily committed and being
confined against his will, Defendant was questioned by two police officers
who visited him in his hospital room.17 Without introducing themselves or
asking a medical provider or Defendant for consent to interview him, the
police officers began questioning him about the circumstances leading up to
his hospitalization, a matter that was wholly unrelated to the crime that oc-
curred on December 10, 2012.18 The police officers questioned Defendant
for approximately one and one half hours, eventually discussing the events
that occurred in the Wal-Mart parking lot, without ever reading him his
Miranda warnings. 19 During the course of the questioning, Defendant even-
tually confessed to the robbery, and at trial, Defendant's motion to suppress
his statements based on a Fifth Amendment violation was denied.20 The
trial court admitted audio recordings from the questioning that occurred at
the hospital, including Defendant's confession, which ultimately led to his
conviction.21
Defendant appealed, claiming that the court erred in denying his Motion
to Suppress, as he was " 'in custody' for purposes of Miranda and was nev-
er read his Miranda warnings. 22 Defense maintained that the police of-
ficer's questioning was a custodial interrogation, and in the absence of the
Miranda warnings, his confession was obtained in violation of his Fifth
Amendment rights.23
First, the North Carolina Court of Appeals declined to view Defendant's
involuntary commitment as being "automatically 'in custody' for purposes
of Miranda warnings," and instead required an analysis of the circumstanc-
es to make a determination. 24 The court analogized his involuntary com-
mitment to that of an incarcerated individual, and emphasized that North
14. Id. at 361-62.
15. Id. at 362.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 372.





24. Id. at 365.
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Carolina courts have not considered incarceration as a determinative fact in
deciding 'custody' for the purposes of Miranda.25 The court of appeals
held that because involuntary commitment is less restrictive than incarcera-
tion, that it would not adopt a "more restrictive [rule] for involuntary com-
mitment."
26
In addition, the court of appeals felt that Defendant's confinement could
not be considered in custody for purposes of Miranda because the restraint
on his movement was due to his medical treatment and not the actions of
the police officers. 27 It felt that a reasonable person in the Defendant's po-
sition would understand that they were being restricted because of their
commitment and not because of the police questioning.28 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new
hearing only to determine the appropriate amount of restitution.29
III. BACKGROUND
The issue of whether an involuntarily committed person is considered in
custody for puroses of Miranda warnings is one of first impression in
North Carolina. 0 In the landmark decision of Miranda, the United States
Supreme Court laid out procedural safeguards to protect the 5th Amend-
ment rights of those individuals subjected to custodial interrogation. 31 Un-
der the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution (and Article I of
the N.C. Constitution32), "[n]o person.., shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself.' 33 In order to "secure the privilege
against self-incrimination" and to ensure a defendant is aware of their con-
stitutional rights, the Miranda Court set out a detailed list of statements that
must be read to any person, before engaging in custodial interrogation (the
"Miranda warnings").34
The entire thrust behind requiring Miranda warnings and developing this
prophylactic rule was to "vest a suspect in custody with an added measure
of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective
proof of the underlying intent of the police," being their ability to "evoke an
incriminating response from a suspect. ' ' 35 As a result, any compelled testi-
25. Id. at 364-65.
26. Id. at 365.
27. Id. at 367-68.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 371-72
30. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 372 (Inman, J., dissenting).
31. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
32. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
35. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
4
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mony that is derived from a Fifth Amendment violation, whether it is un-
warned or simply improperly warned, will be inadmissible by the prosecu-
tion in its case in chief.36 What's more, there is a presumption of compul-
sion on the part of the interrogator whenever they fail to administer Miran-
da warnings to the defendant.37
This standard is not as strict as the application of the "fruit of the poison-
ous tree" doctrine, such as in Fourth Amendment violations, where the vio-
lation itself will taint any confession obtained. 38 The "finding of voluntari-
ness for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a threshold re-
quirement in determining whether the confession may be admitted in evi-
dence., 39 This distinction creates the ability to use a defendant's voluntary
statements.4 0 However, when a confession is derived from custodial inter-
rogation without proper warning being given, it is presumed compelled by
the police officer, and it is deemed inadmissible by the prosecution.41 This
presumption of compulsion, when there is a failure to provide Miranda
warnings, is "generally irrebuttable for the purposes of the prosecution's
case in chief.A
2
The crux of the issue in Hammonds is whether or not the Defendant was
subjected to a custodial interrogation, and thereby was required to be ap-
prised of his constitutional rights. In Miranda, similar to Hammonds, the
suspects were questioned by police officers, "in a room that was cut off
from the outside world," and were not given "full and effective warning[s]
of [their] rights at the outset of the interrogation process. 43 Under the
holding of Miranda, custodial interrogation was defined as "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into cus-
tody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." 4 This determination is not limited to being physically deprived of
freedom of movement, as the United States Supreme Court has adopted an
objective, reasonable man test: "first, what were the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a
reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interro-
gation and leave. ' 45 That Court declined to specify any limited set of cir-
cumstances that are relevant to making a determination, and it chose to "re-
36. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985).
37. Id. at 307.
38. Id at 303.
39. Id at 306.
40. Id. at 307.
41. Id.
42. U.S. v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004).
43. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
44. Id at 444.
45. J.D.B.v.N.C., 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011).
5
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quire[] police officers and courts to 'examine all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation... including any circumstance that 'would have
affected how a reasonable person' in the suspect's position 'would perceive
his or her freedom to leave.'
46
Further, courts have given no consideration to the mindset of the particu-
lar defendant or the interrogating officers, as such a view is irrelevant under
the objective test. 47 The purpose of using an objective view, as explained
by the Court in JD.B. v. North Carolina, is to "give clear guidance to the
police," and to eliminate the burden of police officers to "anticipate the
idiosyncrasies of every individual suspect" and how their traits could affect
their state of mind.48
In State v. Davis, the North Carolina Court of Appeals carefully ex-
plained the 'totality of the circumstances' test that is applied in a determin-
ing whether a defendant is in custody for purposes of Miranda warnings,
and whether there is a "restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest." 49 Under the objective test, the court must
make a determination based on a reasonable person standard on a case-by-
case basis, which takes into account all the facts and circumstances of each
case.50 This means that "no single factor controls the determination," as the
court is free to use a number of factors to decide whether that particular
defendant was in police custody for purposes of Miranda warnings. 51 De-
pending on the particular circumstances, North Carolina courts have uti-
lized a variety of factors in making a determination of custodial interroga-
tion.
In State v. Allen, the North Carolina Court of Appeals set out a list of fac-
tors to be used in situations concerning voluntarily committed hospital pa-
52tients. That court held that when questioning a defendant in a hospital, the
determination of whether it is a custodial interrogation should utilize factors
such as: "(1) whether the defendant was free to go at his pleasure; (2)
whether the defendant was coherent in thought and speech, and not under
the influence of drugs or alcohol; and (3) whether officers intended to arrest
the defendant.,
53
46. Id. at 2402 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. State v. Davis, 763 S.E.2d 585, 590 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. Gaines, 483 S.E.2d
396, 405 (N.C. 1997)).
50. Davis, 763 S.E.2d at 590.
51. Id, (citing State v. Garcia, 597 S.E.2d 724, 737 (N.C. 2004).
52. State v. Allen, 684 S.E.2d 526, 528 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
53. Id. at 530 (finding defendant was not in custody because they were (i) fully coherent, (ii) not
under the influence of any drugs, (iii) never declined to answer any questions or showed any hostility,
and (iv) the police had no intent to arrest).
6
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In contrast, the court in State v. Fisher explained that when the person
being questioned is incarcerated, the court will make a determination as to
whether they are considered in custody by looking at:
(1) whether 'the inmate was free to refuse to go to the place of the interro-
gation'; (2) whether 'the inmate was told that participation in the interro-
gation was voluntary and that he was free to leave at any time'; (3) wheth-
er 'the inmate was physically restrained from leaving the place of interro-
gation'; and (4) whether 'the inmate was free to refuse to answer ques-
tions.'5
4
The Fisher court made it clear: simply being incarcerated is not enough to
consider the defendant automatically in custody for purposes of Miranda
warnings.55 Based on an earlier decision, the court in Fisher held that the
custodial determination must be based on a defendant's "freedom to depart
from the place of his interrogation., 56 Further, because it was not a custo-
dial interrogation, even though the defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment
rights and attempted to end the conversation at one point, there was no need
for the officer to cease questioning because the defendant's Fifth Amend-
ment rights had not attached to the process. 7
Under this backdrop, the Hammonds court attempted to address the
unique situation of those who are involuntarily committed and being ques-
tioned by the police.58 The court first analyzed whether the fact that De-
fendant was involuntarily committed in a hospital setting creates a situation
where he should be considered "automatically 'in custody' for purposes of
Miranda warnings., 59 Although both the prosecution and counsel for De-
fendant attempted to draw similarities between this case and others involv-
ing hospital settings, the court distinguished Defendant's situation, ac-
knowledging that it is "different from a voluntary hospitalization, as there is
no doubt that involuntary commitment places a person in custody and his
freedom of movement may be restricted by law enforcement officers. 6 °
The court chose to focus on the instructiveness of cases involving impris-
omnent, since the two situations both involved "government-imposed con-
finement., 61 The court came to this conclusion because it felt that an invol-
untarily committed patient's government-imposed confinement is the same
54. State v. Fisher, 580 S.E.2d 405, 415 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd, 593 S.E.2d 583 (N.C. 2004).
55. Id.
56. Id. (finding defendant was not in custody because he (i) asked to speak to the officer and
provide information, (ii) was never restrained in any way, and (iii) was free to return to his cell at any
time).
57. Id. at415-16.
58. State v. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d 359, 365 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
59. Id. at 364.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 366.
2016]
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as an incarcerated defendant, and that the facilities in which patients with
psychiatric conditions are treated "are quite similar to those of prisons. 62
The court declined to consider an involuntarily committed patient as 'au-
tomatically' being considered in custody for purposes of Miranda warnings,
since such a restrictive rule was not used in determining prison incarcera-
tion.63 The court felt that since involuntary commitment is "arguably less
restrictive than incarceration," it did not make sense to create a rule that
was more restrictive than those situations concerning incarcerated prison-
ers.64 Since Defendant's circumstances were considered "in the same man-
ner as courts have considered interviews of incarcerated defendants," and
because a prisoner's incarceration is not considered a determinative factor,
the court performed an analysis under the totality of the circumstances.
65
The court in Hammonds appropriately focused on the freedom of move-
ment of the Defendant while making a determination based on the totality
of the circumstances. 66 The court aligned itself with Allen, where it agreed
that "[a]ny restraint in movement [the] defendant may have experienced at
the hospital was due to his medical treatment and not the actions of the po-
lice officers. 6 7  This followed the same line of thought from US. v.
Jamison, where the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the reasona-
ble person test must be considered separate from those restrictions that are
"incident to [the defendant's] background circumstances, '68 and that a court
must instead focus on the "police-imposed restraint.
' 69
The Hammonds court abandoned all other factors in determining the to-
tality of the circumstances, and applied this rule to Defendant's situation,
concluding that a reasonable person in Defendant's position would have
understood their custody to be for the purposes of medical treatment, and
not that of the police interrogation.70 Because Defendant had attempted to
escape the hospital the prior night and had to be physically restrained and
escorted back to his room, the court was able to make a determination that
Miranda should not apply because the Defendant was aware that he was
being held by the hospital and not the police officers.7 1
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 365.
65. Id. at 366.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. The court explained such background circumstances are the injuries suffered, the medical
exigencies they create such as the insertion of an IV line, and a routine investigation initiated by the
injuries.
69. U.S. v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 629 (4th Cir. 2007).
70. State v. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d 359, 367-68 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
71. Id.
8
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However, the dissent in Hammonds was quick to point out that (i) the
court "fail[ed] to weigh other factors necessary to determine" whether the
questioning was custodial and (ii) that involuntarily committed patients are
strikingly different from both voluntary patients and prison inmates.72
Judge Inman explained that the majority, while applying the principles of
Fisher, failed to consider Defendant's "freedom to depart from the place of
his interrogation," as he was not free to leave his hospital room.73 More
specifically, the dissent took issue with the trial court declining to make any
findings regarding whether there was a "restraint on defendant's freedom of
movement" or whether a reasonable person in defendant's circumstances
would not have felt free to terminate the interview or to ask the officers to
leave his room., 7
4
Whereas voluntary patients are not being restrained in any way, involun-
tary patients are subject to legal custody, as involuntary commitment is
obtained through a legal order allowing the taking "into custody for exami-
nation by a physician or eligible psychologist. '75 Further, whereas inmates
are likely to have retained counsel and been read their Miranda rights in
their prior criminal cases, involuntarily committed patients have not been
given those same benefits, and therefore, they should not be considered "so
closely analogous as to obviate the need for additional inquiry where the
person subject to questioning has been involuntarily committed. 76
The majority opinion analogized Defendant's situation with that of a
prison inmate, describing the factors considered in those contexts as laid out
by in Fisher.77 However, the dissent points out that the trial court declined
to apply those rules stated in Fisher, most importantly, by declining to look
at (1) whether the person was "free to refuse to go to the place of the inter-
rogation" and (2) whether the person was "told that participation in the
interrogation was voluntary and that he was free to leave at any time. 78
Judge Inman posits that had the majority conducted a determination of the-
se two factors, the facts would have suggested that Defendant was in custo-
dy, given that he was not free to leave the place he was being interrogated
and that he was never told that his participation was voluntary.7 9 The dis-
sent argues that the trial court's finding that Defendant was not in custody,
absent a finding of whether there was a formal restraint or that a reasonable
72. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 372 (Inman, J., dissenting).
73. Id at 373-74.
74. Id. at 375.
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261 (2013).
76. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 372 (Inman, J., dissenting).
77. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 366.
78. State v. Fisher, 580 S.E.2d 405, 415 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd, 593 S.E.2d 583 (N.C. 2004).
79. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 374 (Inman, J., dissenting).
9
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person would have felt free to end the interrogation, "leaves involuntarily
committed patients vulnerable" to officer interrogations and places the risk
on those who are "suspected of not being able to care for themselves. 8 °
V. ANALYSIS
The decision handed down in State v. Hammonds affects the constitu-
tional rights of those individuals that are involuntarily committed by hold-
ing them to the same standards as prison inmates. 8' The majority opinion
quickly realizes that a person who is involuntarily committed is considered
in "government-imposed confinement" just like one who is incarcerated,
and that the administration of hospitals, that treat psychiatric patients are
similar to prisons.82 However, these two populations are drastically differ-
ent and should be considered separately, rather than "in the same manner as
courts have considered interviews of incarcerated defendants" as the Ham-
monds court considers the Defendant's situation."
83
As the dissenting opinion of Judge Inman points out, Defendant, unlike
prison inmates, has not been charged with a crime.84 Those who have been
convicted of a crime and are serving prison sentences have been read their
Miranda rights prior to their incarceration, sometime during the pendency
of their case, whereas those who are involuntarily committed are not neces-
sarily made aware of their constitutional rights.85 During their initial case, a
prisoner may have retained or been appointed counsel to represent them at
the initial stage of the legal process, and at the very least, been made aware
of their right to remain silent and not incriminate themselves. 86 On the oth-
er hand, although involuntary commitment is similarly considered a legal
process, there is no guarantee that a patient who has been committed invol-
untarily has been read their Miranda rights before police contact.87 Under
the Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Act of
1985 (the "Mental Health Act"), anyone who has knowledge of the defend-
ant's mental illness, on account of which the defendant poses a danger to
themselves or others, may appear before a clerk or magistrate and request
an order to have the defendant involuntarily committed for the purposes of
being examined by a physician or psychologist. 88 Unlike the judicial pro-
80. Id. at 375.
81. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 368.
82. Id. at 366.
83. Id.
84. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 372 (Inman, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 372-73.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 373.
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(a) (2013).
10
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cess for incarceration, involuntary commitment does not require the de-
fendant to be present in front of the magistrate when the commitment Order
is entered, but rather only that an individual has knowledge of the illness
and the ability to execute an Affidavit to that effect. 89 When viewed in a
vacuum, a prison inmate has more general knowledge about his constitu-
tional rights than a hospital patient, because they have had the "benefit" of
proceeding through the legal process beforehand, and have been made
aware of their Miranda rights, such as their ability to remain silent if they so
choose.
The dissent also points out that there is a fundamental difference between
those involuntarily committed and prison inmates that concerns the very
nature of the commitment process: the mental condition of the defendant. 90
Under the Mental Health Act, an involuntary commitment order is issued
for those individuals who are "mentally ill," in order to take them "into
custody for examination by a physician or eligible psychologist." 91 Thus,
when an individual is committed, there has already been a finding by a
magistrate concerning the wellness of the defendant's mental state. Yet,
Hammonds holds those individuals to the same standards as prison inmates
and voluntary hospital patients, who may never have had their mental com-
petency called into question.
92
Involuntary commitment laws exist to protect a population of people that
suffer from mental illness, utilizing systems that were set in place to ensure
the safety of the mentally ill. However, by holding the mentally ill to the
same custodial standard as prison inmates, the Hammonds court seems to
come to a result that fails to protect those patients, but rather, subjects them
to additional constitutional restraint.
93
The Hammonds court is dealing with a unique situation and a unique
subsection of this nation's population, and rather than looking at the scenar-
io as an exception to established procedures, it chose to group them in with
a segment of individuals that seems to be similar in some respects.94 But
are the two groups similar enough to warrant such a generalized rule? The
purpose of requiring Miranda rights is to ensure a defendant is protected
against coercive conduct, and isn't it possible that those who are mentally
ill could be considered more at risk to a police officer's coercive interroga-
tion techniques than a prisoner?9
5
89. Id § 122C-261(a)-(b).
90. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 372 (Inman, J., dissenting).
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(a) (2013).
92. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 364-68.
93. Id. at 366.
94. Id.
95. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
2016]
11
Wolff: Helplessly Imprisoned: State v. Hammonds Holds Involuntarily Comm
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2016
184 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:173
The Hammonds court rests its decision on the simple fact that the De-
fendant attempted to leave the night before the questioning, but was stopped
and escorted back to his room.96 The court felt this event was enough for
the Defendant to understand that he was not free to go because of the hospi-
tal staff and not the actions of the police officers.97 However, the determi-
nation of whether the Defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda
warnings, as admitted by the court, must be "based on the totality of the
circumstances," not just one occurrence.98 As the Court in Miranda held,
custodial interrogation is defined as being questioned by the police when
the defendant has been "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."'99 This point has been stressed by the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals when it held that "no single factor controls the determination" of
whether a defendant was in police custody for purposes of Miranda warn-
ings. 100
The court in Hammonds takes great care to list out a number of factors to
consider in two situations: voluntary hospital patients and prison inmate
questioning. 101 Curious enough, the court focuses on how a "reasonable
man in [defendant's] position would have understood his situation"' 0 2 with-
out conducting a rigorous analysis using any of those factors. The court
ultimately held that Defendant would have understood his freedom of
movement to be restricted because of his medical treatment simply because
his attempt to escape "took place before the police interview." 10 3 By focus-
ing on the "purpose behind a defendant's restraint" as being "much more
relevant," the court seems to abandon its structured analysis under the total-
ity of the circumstances. 104 However, the United States Supreme Court
held that the test would look to see if a reasonable person would have felt
free to leave, and that there must be an examination of "all of the circum-
stances surrounding the interrogation. ' ' 1°
But viewing the situation objectively, isn't it reasonable that Defendant
did not feel free to leave the questioning because he had already been es-
corted back to his bed less than 24 hours prior?10 6 Simply because it was
the security guards that physically forced him back to his room, as opposed
96. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 367.
97. Id. at 368.
98. Id. at 366.
99. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (emphasis added).
100. State v. Davis, 763 S.E.2d 585, 590 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Garcia, 597 S.E.2d at 737).
101. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 366-67.
102. Id. at 367 (quoting State v. Buchanan, 543 S.E.2d 823, 829 (N.C. 2001)).
103. Id. (emphasis in original).
104. Id. at 368 (emphasis in original).
105. J.D.B. v. N.C., 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011) (emphasis added).
106. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 361.
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to the police officers, should the Defendant now feel free to leave? 10 7 By
looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the police interroga-
tion, it seems the Defendant reasonably felt that his freedom had been re-
stricted.108 The hospital staff had already confined Defendant to his room
once before, why would he now feel that he was free to leave the police
interview without similar intervention? 10 9
The court declines to view any other attending circumstances, and relies
solely on the holding of US. v. Jamison, in which the court held that a de-
termination of custodial interrogation must be "careful to separate the re-
strictions on his freedom arising from police interrogation and those inci-
dent to his background circumstances." ' 10 The defendant in Jamison ar-
gued that the affixing of paper bags to his hands (a process used by police
for all shooting victims until a decision can be made whether to test for
gunshot residue) rendered him in custody."' However, the Jamison court
concluded that the affixing of paper bags "does not alone render his ques-
tioning custodial." ' 1 2 Whereas the Hammonds court uses this rule as de-
terminative, 113 wiping away any possibility that Defendant's situation could
be considered custodial, the court in Jamison merely stated that it does not
do so on its own.1 14 The dissenting opinion touched on this subtle but cru-
cial inadequacy when it stated that this case is not "so closely analogous [to
cases involving prison inmates] to obviate the need for additional in-
quiry." 1
15
The majority opinion simply fails to continue its analysis and declines to
consider whether a reasonable person in the Defendant's position (1) was
free to refuse to go to the place of interrogation, (2) was told that their par-
ticipation was voluntary, (3) was physically restrained from leaving, and (4)
refused to answer questions. 16 Defendant's situation contained several
facts that would satisfy a number of those factors found in Fisher, but none
were ever considered by the Hammonds court."
17
First, the fact that Defendant had to be physically escorted back to his




110. U.S. v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 629 (4th Cir. 2007).
111. Id. at 629-30.
112. Id. at630.
113. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 367-68.
114. Jamison, 509 F.3d at 630.
115. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 372 (Inman, J., dissenting).
116. State v. Fisher, 580 S.E.2d 405, 415 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd, 593 S.E.2d 583 (N.C. 2004).
117. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 364-68.
2016]
13
Wolff: Helplessly Imprisoned: State v. Hammonds Holds Involuntarily Comm
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2016
186 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAWREVIEW [Vol. 38:173
place of interrogation. 18 Although the majority opinion claims that De-
fendant was not in custody since this was a hospital restraint and not police
restraint,119 a further reading of Jamison shows that this is not determina-
tive, and it must be considered under the totality of the circumstances.1
20
As Fisher points out, custodial interrogation must be "determined by con-
sidering [Defendant's] freedom to depart from the place of his interroga-
tion. The fact is, Defendant simply did not feel free to go from the place
of his interrogation, regardless of who was physically restraining him.
Viewed objectively, there is little reason to believe that any reasonable per-
son in Defendant's situation would feel they were free to leave the police
interview after they had already been restricted to that room by hospital
staff.122 It is simply not reasonable for a person in Defendant's position to
assume that once police have begun their questioning, they now have the
freedom to leave that place of interrogation. Since being restrained the
prior night, nothing had occurred to lead a reasonable person to believe they
are now free to leave. In fact, the police presence alone, without any form
of consent on the Defendant's part, would lead to the exact opposite con-
clusion. 1
23
Looking at the second factor, Defendant was never told that his participa-
tion in the questioning was voluntary. 124 The court agrees that the Defend-
ant "was not told that he could not stop the conversation or request that the
officers leave," but this is vastly different from a suspect being explicitly
told that they are free to refuse any questioning if they so choose.1"5 The
second factor laid out by Fisher concerns when a defendant was told he had
a choice to participate, and it is not analogous to the police officer's omis-
sion of advising of the defendant's choice to participate. 126 Further, the
police officers simply asked a nurse for permission to speak to the patient-Defendant never gave his consent to be interviewed, nor did the Defendant
consent to the officers taping the conversation. 127 Both of these actions
could be taken as custodial, as a reasonable person could assess the situa-
tion as hostile when they are questioned by the police without providing
consent, or even being asked for their consent.
118. Id. at 367.
119. Id. at 367-68.
120. U.S. v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 630 (4th Cir. 2007).
121. Fisher, 580 S.E.2d at 415.
122. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 361.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 363.
125. Id.
126. Fisher, 580 S.E.2d at 415.
127. Id. at 362-63.
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The Hammonds court failed to address either of these impactful issues
when considering how a reasonable person would assess Defendant's situa-
tion, instead relying solely on the purpose behind Defendant's restraint in
making its decision.
128
By analogizing Defendant's situation to that of a prison inmate, the court
creates a situation where Defendant would have been unable to stop police
questioning because he was not considered in custody by police. 129 As the
court held in Fisher, where there is no custodial interrogation, the defend-
ant's Fifth Amendment rights have not attached, and even if the defendant
attempts to invoke their right to remain silent, police are not required to
cease questioning.1 30 Here, Defendant was being confined to his room and
was unable to physically leave the questioning. 3 1 By applying the prece-
dent from Fisher, he would have also been unable to force the police to
cease questioning because they were not the ones physically confining him
and his Fifth Amendment rights were not yet attached. 132 As a result, this
leaves Defendant in a situation where he is not free to leave the area of in-
terrogation, and he is unable to stop the questioning process until he feels
restrained by the police themselves.' 
33
Although determinations of custodial interrogation must be made objec-
tively, this decision ultimately affects a large portion of the population that
are suffering from mental illness. Essentially, those who are deemed to
have a mental illness are grouped in and evaluated in the same manner as
prison inmates. While a court cannot view a defendant's situation subjec-
tively and take his or her mental illness into consideration, the court should
at the very least make an effort to afford the Defendant a full analysis under
the totality of the circumstances.
As the dissent points out, it is important for the trial courts to consider
additional factors when it is a matter of first impression. 3 4 What the Ham-
monds court does instead, is analogize Defendant's circumstances to a sce-
nario that is arguably vastly different. Defendant had not been charged
with a crime, he suffers from a mental illness, he had been previously es-
corted back to his room, and he was not given an avenue to leave the ques-
tioning or even advised that his participation was voluntary. 135 Whereas the
appellate court rightly concludes that involuntary commitment is similar to
128. Id. at 366.
129. Id. at 367-68.
130. State v. Fisher, 580 S.E.2d 405, 415-16 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), aff'd, 593 S.E.2d 583 (N.C.
2004).
131. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 362.
132. Fisher, 580 S.E.2d at 415-16.
133. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 367-68.
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incarceration as they are both "government-imposed confinement[s]," that
is where the similarities end. 136 As discussed, incarcerated individuals have
been through the judicial process, they have the ability to either retain legal
counsel or have been appointed one, and they have been made aware of
their Miranda rights at one point. The majority opinion never takes into
account the differences of the two situations, and by grouping mentally ill
patients with prison inmates, they run the risk of creating a standard that is
less than that of others who have not been charged with a crime.
The very nature of imprisonment ensures that prisoners are not granted
the same constitutional rights as those who are not incarcerated. Although
they are still granted many of their constitutional rights, regulations in place
that restrict those freedoms and rights are still considered valid. As the
United States Supreme Court has held, "when a prison regulation impinges
on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests. 137 As such, a prison inmate is
not guaranteed the full protection from the United States Constitution, as
those restrictions that provide a legitimate reason in line with their punish-
ment are free to impinge on their protections. Unlike prison confinement,
the involuntary commitment of an individual does not serve a penological
interest. Under the Mental Health Act, the purpose of entering a commit-
ment order is not punishment, but rather to have the defendant examined by
a physician or psychologist. 138 The necessity behind Defendant's commit-
ment was not to punish him for some wrong, but merely to address a mental
illness after he attempted suicide. 139 At the time of the police interview,
Defendant was not being charged with any crime, but was being treated for
a mental illness. 140 This is unlike incarceration where a defendant's rights
are lessened as a punishment in connection with their imprisonment.
141
To characterize involuntarily committed patients as being synonymous
with prison inmates rather than other voluntary patients, is in essence creat-
ing an inference that courts are free to impinge on the constitutional rights
of those mentally ill patients. In Defendant's case, where he is being com-
mitted for an unrelated incident of attempted suicide, he is compared to a
prisoner rather than a hospital patient simply because a magistrate has
deemed it necessary to hold him for a 24 hour period for his safety.142
Where courts hold that the lessening of constitutional rights is justified for
136. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 366.
137. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(a) (2013).
139. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 361.
140. Id.
141. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89.
142. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 361.
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penological interests, there is simply no evidence of such reasoning in cases
involving involuntary commitment. There is no justification for a hospital-
ized individual to be subject to a lesser standard than others who are volun-
tarily seeking medical treatment, as a reduced standard would similarly not
serve any penological interest.
This decision and the restriction it imposes on involuntarily committed
patients places a dangerous risk on a population that is suffering from men-
tal illness, by lowering the standards by which courts view custodial inter-
rogation when they are being questioned by the police. This 'lesser stand-
ard' is at odds with the Mental Health Act which holds that all involuntary
commitments "shall be accomplished under conditions that protect the dig-
nity and constitutional rights of the individual. 143 The statute specifically
states that although the patient is being held involuntarily, that their consti-
tutional rights must be protected. 144 Hammonds on the other hand, holds
mentally ill patients to a standard equivalent to that of a prisoner, who are
not afforded all of their rights because it serves a penological interest.1
41
V. CONCLUSION
The holding of State v. Hammonds adequately states those factors used in
analyzing whether there is a custodial interrogation, but fails to apply them
to the unique situation concerning involuntarily committed patients. 146 Ra-
ther than performing a full analysis by examining the totality of the circum-
stances, and focusing on what makes these situations so unique, the court
analogizes it to government-imposed confinement of prisoner incarcera-
tions. 47 In doing so, it fails to adequately represent a population of people
that are already at risk due to their mental illness and afford them the same
constitutional restraints as those who are convicted criminals.
By not performing a full assessment on the situation, and focusing on the
complexities of Defendant's circumstances, the appellate court has missed
an opportunity to develop a new standard set of factors to encompass situa-
tions involving involuntary commitments, and at the very least, to give a
defendant who was not charged with any crime the same constitutional
benefits as those who seek hospital treatment voluntarily.
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-201 (2013).
144. Id.
145. Hammonds, 777 S.E.2d at 366.
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